











































Flexicurity – from political celibrity to contested labour market arrangement in crisis?

Within a very short period of time “flexicurity” has become a European buzz-word. The EU officially included the concept and political strategies connected to it into its own European Employment Strategy in 2007 and since every member country has had to report to the European Union about improvements along the flexicurity road. Each country still has a right to choose its own road map, but no one can escape flexicurity initiatives and assessments.

Amongst the European countries famous for already existing flexicurity arrangements, Denmark no doubt has had a prominent position. It has been seen as the model country. Delegation after delegation is visiting Denmark and the scientific debates concentrates to a large degree on Danish experiences and arrangements since the beginning of the 1990es.

The Danish flexicurity system has been called a “model” in both political and scientific debates. This might give a wrong impression that you directly can copy a model or a system. The Danish system is to be understood as historically established and interrelated elements in regulating the labour market in which a highly mobile labour market, income security and employment security for wage earners are institutionalized. These interrelationships in the Danish system are unique in some respects. But the fundamental rationale is to strengthen economic dynamism, protected mobility and security at the same time. Flexibility and security are not contradictory to each other. That means: employers have special liberal conditions for hiring and firing but the welfare state arrangements give wage earners reasonable good economic compensation in case of unemployment and also help by the state to be able to reenter the open labour market. The last kinds of efforts are shaped by active labour market policy (ALMP)​[1]​, educational measures (especially the continuous vocational training system (CVT)), good child care facilities and other welfare state arrangements​[2]​. 

More kinds of balances have historically been built into the system in order to have a sustainable labour market system operating. That means that the flexicurity system also should be a shelter against the wind in times of economic crisis as we are witnessing just now. Opponents of the “flexicurity approach” of the EU are referring to changes in the Danish system since mid-2008 as evidence of a fundamental crack in the flexicurity “model”: high increase in unemployment, a relative fall in employment, changes in GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and a growing deficit on the public budget. These critics make sarcastic talk about flexicurity as only “for good weather” (Tangian 2010) and advocate the traditional trade union answer of protecting jobs instead of protecting “employment security”.

This report will go into the Danish developments during years of crisis and confront these with the rationale of the labour market arrangements and the expected reactions within the system to growing problems and challenges. Can Danish flexicurity be put in the museum now? 

In order to make an assessment, it is necessary also to specify the changing political framing. ALMP was an invention by a Social Democratic lead government by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, starting in 1993, and the success of the Danish flexicurity system is highly interrelated with this new “activation” approach, giving people further training and education, job training and other measures that could improve their skills and abilities and help them to reenter the labour market. Macro-economic initiatives supported the goal of full employment. Because of the economic progress and improved employment, the length of the unemployment benefit period could be shorted from 7 to 4 years.

In 2001, a right wing government took office and soon the Danish LMP was to be reformed, both as to the governance structure and as to the content of the measures. In 2007, the social partners were no longer to be part of public policy as they had been before. Regional labour market policy and the corporatist bodies responsible for the planning and implementation of this (14 regional labour market boards) were suspended. Instead 91 local job centres were established with the social partners in advisory positions only. From 1.8.2009, the municipalities have taken over formal responsibility of “employment policy” – also for insured wage earners. LMP was renamed in 2001: “employment policy” was the new name, indicating that it was only job that counts. Education was no longer used as a primary measure. More “work first” elements have been introduced in the system, giving social discipline a prominent position. Sanctions were introduced. Integration policy was also used as a lever to obtain more general changes in the activation and security systems.

Danish LMP seems no longer to be the progressive edition of the 1990es. Now it looks more like a mainstreamed European “work first” approach. And corporatism has been abolished, giving the municipalities full responsibility for activation and employment measures, but still with the state as a controlling and steering body above. As a governance structure, a principal-agent relationship has been established. Successes of the government to change the security elements in the Danish system are, however, also to be recorded. The last one is a reduction of the length of the benefit period to 2 years only, decided on in spring 2010.

Will the Danish flexicurity system break down because of this internal political recalibration of LMP and the external economic pressures since mid-2008? Or will it survive partly or in total? What is the assessment? Based on the interrelationships in the Danish flexicurity system you would expect the following to happen in times of economic recession – and we will confront it with empirical evidence:
-	Firstly, a steep increase in unemployment will be inevitable. Employers will immediately adjust manpower to production needs as this is legal and without strong cost for them. Next, common efforts to combat unemployment developments will be started. Cooperative solution will normally be found, also with the help of agreements between the social partners.
-	Secondly, economic stabilizers in the system will keep domestic demand at a certain level, checking the unemployment figures. Expansive finance policy will be implemented. The unemployment level will stabilize – and stay below the European average. 
-	Thirdly, LMP measures to reemploy people (especially youngsters and long-term unemployed) will be strengthened, implementation will put responsibility on more actors, and also youth and long-term unemployment will stabilize at a comparatively low level. 

But adjustments need time. Here we must use 2008-2010 developments in confronting these statements. Can these three kinds of reactions be identified in Denmark in 2010? 

The coming of the economic crisis 2008-2010 and the problem structure 
The dramatic change in Danish economy with the coming of the economic crisis in the second part of 2008 is to be seen in the unemployment figures. In June 2008, Denmark flagged the lowest rate of unemployment in the European Union while in June 2010 Denmark had dropped back to position 5 in the rank (Eurostat 2010). Figures 3 and 4 prove the changed situation.
 
Figure 1: European unemployment rates June 2008

Figure 2: European unemployment rates June 2010
















  Source: Eurostat
In absolute terms, Denmark is performing a little bit better, but you still have to accept that one of the “flexicurity” indicators has less good scores. This change of situation within the labour market must, however, also be seen in relation to a quick and clear fall in production (BNP) of more than the European average and a corresponding fall in employment, e.g. taking into account the national development of the business cycle. More than 170.00 jobs have been lost during the last two years in Denmark. This gives a much more detailed picture of an economy experiencing an abrupt change of situation – but then it is also less dramatic when compared to other European countries. A fall in Danish employment from August 2008 to February 2010 of 2.6 percent is only slightly higher than the average for EU-27 of 2.3 percent (Madsen 2010). This must be seen in the light of decreasing demand for labour in Danish private enterprises. Denmark then is not to be classified as an extreme case amongst the European countries. 
A comment of the statistics is important too. One has to notice that there is an increasing gap between the Danish registered rate of unemployment (4.1 in June 2010) and the rate of unemployment according to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) standing (6.6) (Danmarks Statistik 2010; Eurostat 2010). This gap has been steadily increasing since 2007 (Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd 2010), but as most people will use the LFS figures, the situation might look more dramatic as it is perceived in Denmark. Danish flexicurity is performing better as to fighting unemployment that seen in the LFS statistics. Distributional effects in unemployment are clear, however: Especially young people, unskilled workers and immigrants and non-insured unemployed have been more severely hit by unemployment. 
The reactions and stabilizing effects of the Danish flexicurity system
Based on the Nordic policy legacy and the Danish flexicurity rationale, a combination of general macro-economic and selective labour market policy initiatives were to be expected in the Danish system, trying to combat the downturn of economic activities and rising unemployment (Magnusson et.al. 2008). This has also happened. Fiscal policy initiatives in 2009 and 2010 have been followed by some focused and group-based LMP measures during the last two years. But not all of the political responses to the crisis are in accordance with the “flexicurity” rationale, which is to be commented on soon. Let´s first have a look at the macro-economic initiatives. 
The existence of a large public sector in Denmark with strong built-in stabilizers due to high incomes taxes and a large proportion of the workforce covered by unemployment insurance do give the economy some help in times of a rapid economic turndown. Actually, Denmark has some of the largest built-in automatic stabilizers in the EU which can be seen from figure 4 (Dolls et al, 2009). 

Figure 4: Income stabilization in different European countries


The figures show that the way the welfare state system is operating - given the national tax, benefits and social insurance structure - has the best positive repercussions on economic activity in Denmark. Because of high unemployment benefits and relatively high social assistance benefits you also stabilize domestic demand and thereby also the total economic activity in society. Without such economic stabilizers unemployment would have been rising much more.
Thus the effects of the economic downturn on income and unemployment are significantly mitigated. But the other side of the coin is that the development in the public budgets will mirror this during the crisis; a dramatic change from a surplus of 3.4 per cent (60 billion DKK in 2008) has been turned into a deficit of 2.7 per cent in 2009. In 2010 a deficit of 5.5 per cent is expected. Ironically, what traditional economists now praise as automatic stabilizers – that is high public spending, unemployment benefits, graduated incomes taxes, and welfare state activities – previous to the present crisis were looked upon as enemies of growth and economic balance. They are not. 

Financial policy has been expansive during 2009 and the beginning of 2010. After two “Bank packages”, “Growth packages” have been decided on and implemented. Effects have also been visible. The measures in “Forårspakke 2.0” in 2009 included: Municipalities could increase their investments, private house renovation was subsidized, new investments in infrastructure were planned, and a tax-reform made effective from 2010, lowering marginal tax rates amongst other things. It is especially difficult to assess the precise effects of lower incomes taxes on private consumption and employment. However, the expansionary character of these measures all together is undisputable. In late 2009, new decisions were taken to increase public investments with 5 billion D.kr. for the period 2010-2013 and the municipalities were allowed to borrow 3 billion D.kr. more for investments in 2010. Finally, financial resources from a so-called “globalization fund” has been allocated to a number of initiatives in order to support research, education, and entrepreneurship (1.2 billion D.kr.). But the non-discretionary nature of the system has called for adjustments and not for large scale policy reforms.
The government has been very optimistic until spring 2010 as to economic recovery. But then a changed opinion is visible. Now a more pessimistic attitude and a new approach more in line with the European non-Keynesian one is becoming dominant. The expansionist approach seems to come to an end soon. Withdrawal of strong economic support for the weak economic upswing is threatening with the finance budget for 2011. Still an expected deficit of 78 billion DKK is a picture of both the economic situation and the political priorities. Even though Denmark is not part of common European currency, the Euro, the authorities are keen on bringing Denmark below a deficit of 3 per cent of GDP and behave in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. Now the public sector is to suffer, to have no increases in budgets in general and cuts in more sectors. This also goes for the CVT system. Private consumption is to be the key to growth and balance. The different political “packages” to prevent the economy from a breakdown certainly have had a stabilizing impact and the built-in stabilizers do help this to happen, but now new political priorities with a less expansive financial policy and cuts in public budgets threatens economic stabilization. It is a well known “European” picture (Bosch and Watt 2010).  
As to labour market policy interventions some new measures have been decided on during 2009 and the first part of 2010. Two “packages” have been implemented as the most important answer from the government to the unemployment developments. Youth unemployment had been brought down to a very low level in the years 2005-2008 but young people were the first to experience rising unemployment. Measures to bring those youngsters either in activation, supported jobs, in apprenticeship arrangements or in educational arrangements were decided on in 2009. A training subsidy to employers in case of hiring unemployed people and stronger educational schemes were proposed by the social partners and decided on in spring 2009. 
In spring 2010, the long-term unemployment developments called, finally, for new initiatives. The starting point was, however, an extreme low level. Compared to the European average the situation is not dramatic. This is illustrated by figure 7 which also has a gender dimension included. Only Cypres has had as low a total figure in 2008. The measures already decided on by the Danish Parliament in an action plan to combat long-term unemployment will also have an effect in the months and years to come – even if this late initiative could be stronger. A doubling of long-term unemployment by 2010 is a challenge for Danish flexicurity because of other political decisions made recently. The shortening of the benefit period from 4 to 2 years and the difficulties in regaining unemployment benefit rights might threaten the situation for quite a number of people in the years to come. 
Figure 5: Long-term unemployment in European countries 2008, total and by gender

The government has not re-programmed the “employment policy” despite the economic crisis. It has only made the situation for young people a bit more optimistic with the special measures created. Long-term demographic factors and the non-discretionary character of the system clearly make the political will of recalibrating the LMP again rather retrained. The future Danish problems in respect to demography are in no way of the same magnitude as those found in other European countries. 
The Danish government has made piece-meal changes to Danish ALMP during the last 7 years and there is a clear pattern behind the efforts. Activation policy has been renewed, introducing more “work first” elements, and it is no longer of the same active kind as one of the 1990´es (Jørgensen 2010). The governance structure of the LMP has been strongly reformed, making the municipalities fully responsible – also economically – for all unemployed (including their benefits) albeit with the state refunding most of this. The administration of benefits for the insured will still be with the unemployment insurance funds – for the moment. They are in danger of being substituted by the state itself or by the municipalities in future decisions. But this will be against the will of the trade unions. - As to the content of ALMP, policy measures against rising unemployment have been created with young people and long-term unemployed at the centre. Activation is now upgraded again, but with outsourcing to private firms as a policy goal. LMP is highly sensitive in relation to the business cycle and the public deficit is certainly a stress factor to the system.
When assessing the reactions of the Danish flexicurity system to the economic crisis you must look at more than political initiatives. This is a very important point. The social partners have made a number of joint decisions to stabilize the labour market developments, adjusting amongst other things working time arrangements and wage formation to changing circumstances. Private regulation and adaptation is important in Denmark. On the sectoral level and on the local level, adjustments have taken place, most of which have been consensual in character despite the conflict-ridden labour market developments. The collective agreements are made in ways that give possibilities of local adjustments in case of agreement between the two sides of industry. This is a reflection of the built-in stabilizers in the process-structures of the Danish employment system. The dramatic fall in production and employment has now been turned into growth figures. From the first to the second quarter of 2010, employment was again rising in Denmark – a positive sign of more than stabilization. The prospects for economic growth in 2011 lies just below 2 per cent according to the government (budget for 2011, September 2010). 
On the sectoral level, wage flexibility has been increased too but at the same time there has been, for the first time, an introduction in the collective agreements in spring 2010 of payment in case of dismissal for people with tenure of more than three years. This is a first step away from the Danish flexicurity principles as it could be seen as another kind of job protection measure. However, my interpretation is that it is a kind of political protest against the missing regulation of the level of unemployment benefits. During the last two decades the average replacement rate has been lowered, and especially people with high salaries will experience a severe loss of money in case of unemployment. Professional groups having only 50 per cent or less in replacement rate are not uncommon now. Therefore, it is a signal to the political system of improving the benefits. The answer from the government was a shortening of the benefit period from 4 to 2 years only – without any change of benefit level. This provocation has been perceived as a declaration of war by the side of the trade unions. And, consequently, they fully support the left wing parties´ plan for growth and welfare (the Social democrats and the Socialist Folks Party). An election is to be held within the next year. 
During years of crises, the highly mobile Danish labour market has been effective and employment security has not disappeared. Priority has been given to a strict regime of activation and to support for education and training until 2010. Keeping income security intact has been more difficult because of the government´s liberal proposals; but for most wage earners the system has confirmed its value. The policy-mix has been put to a test; but it did not fail, it seems. 
It is important again to stress that the political efforts of the Parliament cannot be seen in isolation from the private collective bargaining and collective agreement system also regulating the labour market in Denmark. This is done in partial coordination between the political system and the social partners. It is the interplay between macro-economic governance, collective bargaining and ALMP that has produced “good governance”. The present government is making risky experiments with the stabilizing arrangements and the contact capabilities. 
With the abolishing of both political and administrative corporatism during the last few years by the side of the liberal-conservative government, the social partner continue their own regulations but with weaker coordination with the political efforts (Jørgensen 2010). A potential threat to the common understandings, coordination efforts, and the cooperative mood in Denmark is visible. Danish flexicurity is less secure on the process side – and this can have repercussions as to the functioning of the system and the results produced seen in a longer term perspective. Trust can be broken down - and cooperation will be eroded then. 
But it is equally important to learn from the Danish developments that a mobile labour market, transitional labour market opportunities and a policy of full employment still can be combined (Schmid 2008). Good and trustful processes and robust policy results are strongly interconnected in a flexicurity system.
Is the party over?
Seen from abroad, there is perhaps no basis for having a party any longer as Danish flexicurity is considered to have severe problems. Danish flexicurity is not delivering and can no longer be a role model for other European countries - as to the critics. Despite the support of the EU to flexicurity, open opposition to a flexicurity strategy is to be recorded now, especially in Southern European countries and Germany. Is the party over? Our analysis indicates that it might be too early to say goodbye to flexicurity. 
As a political strategy is must always be developed in accordance with the national traditions and institutional set-ups; but seen as a concept covering a state of affair and a way of operating a national labour market system, the Danish developments since 2008 do not give the pessimists right. The system has proved its ability to react over time to changing circumstances with both political and private, collective initiatives to deal with most of the problems and in ways not doing damage to the fundamental rationale of the flexicurity system - also despite an asocial tax policy and a recalibration of LMP by the right wing government. Otherwise, the actions and reactions within the Danish system seem to be in accordance with the three kinds of reactions expected - and confronted with empirical material. 
The flexible character of the Danish labour market has shown its functioning, keeping mobility very high despite lower economic activity and rising unemployment. Job destruction and job creation has remained at a high level during years of crisis. Job-to-job mobility has also remained at a very high level. Changes and adjustments need time, however, and a longer time perspective will increasingly prove that the system itself is able to deal with most of the challenges. It is not the relative increase in unemployment and short-time changes that counts but the bottom level over a longer period of time when adaptations have been made. These involve actors and arrangements at all levels. Regulation of employment and labour market performance has many actors and action fields. Youth unemployment have been conquered, unemployed reemployed by strengthening activation measures, and the social partners have adjusted wage formation and working-time arrangements. The “secret” to success is to support positive interactions creating virtuous circles between different policies and to foster cooperation between actors. Nothing is optimal; but there is no breakdown of the flexicurity system until now. Despite crisis, employment problems, and political conflicts, The Danish system still works. 
However, because of political and ideological reasons the present right wing government has changed part of the institutional structure for coordination and cooperation within the system during the last 3-4 years. This was a first weakening of the system. Secondly, the government has responded in a reasonable way to the economic crisis in macro-economic terms during 2008, 2009, and the beginning of 2010 combining sound macro-economic support for an employment-friendly policy and new group-oriented measures in LMP. But it has also made decisions directly turned against the trade unions and the unemployed people. The trade unions have an ideological opponent in the present government, and the bill for adjustments to the economic crisis has been forwarded to people on unemployment benefits and on social assistance, including immigrants and refugees. Tax reductions have been positive to high-income groups while those at the bottom of the wage hierarchy have suffered. The negative effects on public budgets are clear while the positive effects on domestic demand and employment are not that secure. The only secure thing is that the tax reforms are under-financed in the short run, contributing to a growing public financial deficit. Without tree tax reforms, Denmark would have had no problems performing well and in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact criteria. 
Direct governmental initiatives to destabilize the trade unions – through tax reforms, abolishment of political support for trade union membership fees, creation of cross-professional unemployment insurance funds etcetera - have resulted in open protests and demonstrations during the last two years. The anti-social side of governmental policy is a threat to some of the security elements in Danish flexicurity. Answers from the side of the social partners have been seen too, also common ones (amongst those protests against municipalization and the new set-up of governance structure of LMP). 
The income security elements are not the only one that counts. Employment security and welfare state arrangements are very important in this respect. Still, Denmark has supporting and comprehensive child care facilities, helping the nation to reach one of the highest employment rates in the world – also for women. However, the pressure for having stronger ALMP measures implemented is growing. A more comprehensive re-programming of ALMP might be needed, again abolishing more “work first” elements in activation policy. And a new threat to the balances and performance of the Danish employment system is emerging with the new financial government proposals for 2011, according to which the strong macro-economic support for demand is to be downsized.   
Dramatic changes are not to be expected before after the coming election. Some time-lag in adjustments within the Danish flexicurity system must be recorded too. Fundamental arguments to stop the party are, however, difficult to find. Let us stick to the facts: 
-	Danish flexicurity was not invented politically – and it will not disappear because of short-sided decisions by an ideological right wing government. Flexicurity is the historically institutionalized relationships between the labour market regime and public policies in relation to security for wage earners and dynamics in the labour market. Institutional complementarities will still be produced, also during years of crisis. They are difficult to put down in statistical calculations and to be reflected in traditional economic theory. 
-	The flexicurity system is embedded in a special policy-mix of general macro-economic policies and selective policy efforts in order to deal with wicked problems. No isolated policy response is sufficient. It is precisely the interplay within the system between the elements and the adaptation processes that stabilize the system after even dramatic changes. In the Danish case, the welfare system with its automatic stabilizers and the collective efforts to stabilize the economy and to defend employment security account for the positive turn in production, employment and investments now visible in 2010.
-	Danish flexicurity was not created with the ALMP of the 1990´es – and it will not disappear because of political mis-management of the active elements during some years. At local and regional level, common strategies and solutions to unemployment problems are still being developed by the municipal representatives and the social partners. Trust has not been broken down yet in the Danish system between the private actors; and “activation” is not the sole responsibility of the Minister of Employment. Especially the efforts to combat long-term unemployment seem to be in need of improvements.
-	The Danish flexicurity system has been developed during more than 100 years – and it will not disappear with governmental policy decisions in 2010. Protected mobility, dynamism and security elements are fundamental. Some of the basic relationships between elements are to be found too in par example the Swedish employment system and in the Nordic traditions for securing growth and welfare. Therefore, there will, probably, still be a future for Danish flexicurity. And the Nordic approach to growth and welfare might still have interesting lessons to be learned from in other parts of Europe. 
















^1	  By labour market policy (LMP) we understand political efforts to match supply and demand within the labour market by the help of supporting information and service systems and to give economic support to wage earners while being unemployed. Active labour market policy (ALMP) is to be understood as direct political interventions to counteract mis-match problems and political undesired results of the market processes. Examples of these kinds of measures are job training, wage subsidies, further training and education, quotas and other forms of regulative measures.    
^2	  A longer and more elaborated edition of this report with definitions of flexicurity, analytical positions and historical analysis is to be found in Henning Jørgensen: Stress-testing for real: Danish flexicurity during years of crisis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010.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